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Abstract—Local differential privacy (LDP) has been deemed
as the de facto measure for privacy-preserving distributed data
collection and analysis. Recently, researchers have extended LDP
to the basic data type in NoSQL systems: the key-value data, and
show its feasibilities in mean estimation and frequency estimation.
In this paper, we develop a set of new perturbation mechanisms
for key-value data collection and analysis under the strong model
of local differential privacy. Since many modern machine learning
tasks rely on the availability of conditional probability or the
marginal statistics, we then propose the conditional frequency
estimation method for key analysis and the conditional mean
estimation for value analysis in key-value data. The released
statistics with conditions can further be used in learning tasks.
Extensive experiments of frequency and mean estimation on both
synthetic and real-world datasets validate the effectiveness and
accuracy of the proposed key-value perturbation mechanisms
against the state-of-art competitors.
Index Terms—Key-value data collection, Local differential
privacy, Mean estimation, Frequency estimation.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of big data, personal-related data from user’s
side is routinely collected and analyzed by service providers
to improve the quality of services. However, for the user side,
directly sending original data can somehow lead to information
leakage, which may draw potential privacy issues in many
data-driven applications. To handle the privacy concerns, many
mechanisms are proposed for privacy-preserving data analysis,
among which stands out the differential privacy [1], [2], [3].
Usually, there are two kinds of differential privacy: the cen-
tralized setting and the local setting. In the centralized setting,
the result of a query is computed, and then a noisy version
of the output is returned (usually with Laplace noise [1]). In
the local setting, the collecting and analyzing flow can be
included into three steps: 1) Each record is first encoded into
a specific data format (for example, by bloom filters). 2) Then
the encoded data are perturbed. 3) At last, data from user
side are aggregated and analyzed. Mechanisms with local
differential privacy guarantee an individual’s privacy against
TABLE I
EXAMPLE FOR KEY-VALUE DATA
Users Food and ratings
user 1 〈Hamburger, 0.65〉, 〈Mash, 0.8〉, 〈Pepsi, 0.8〉
user 2 〈Hamburger, 0.8〉, 〈Fries,−0.3〉, 〈Pepsi, 0.9〉
user 3 〈Salad, 0.75〉, 〈Fries,−0.1〉, 〈Pepsi, 0.8〉
... ...
potential adversaries (including the aggregator in LDP). The
local differential privacy has been widely used in crowdsourc-
ing and IoT scenarios for privacy-preserving data analytics [4],
[5]. To analyze user’s data with high-level privacy guarantees,
respected data service providers have applied local differential
in their services. Google has proposed RAPPOR [6] for
crowdsourcing statistics in Chrome. Microsoft proposed a
memoization mechanism for continual data collection. Apple
has used differential privacy for frequency estimation [7], such
as identifying popular emojis.
Recently, a significant amount of attention has been focused
on improving accuracy in mean and histogram estimation
with local differential privacy guarantees, such as categorical
values [6], set values [8], [9] and numerical values [10], [11].
For the first time, Ye et al. [12] formalize the frequency
and mean estimation problems for key-value data under local
differential privacy. Our work will improve previous studies
in data collecting and analyzing of key-value data. For further
clarification, we start from a dietary rating example.
Motivating example. As shown in Table I, assume that
analysts consider ratings of the food by collecting users’ scores
on each specific food. Each record consists of a set of key-
value data and represents the orderings of an individual, where
each key-value data shows one’s appetite on the given food
(note that the rating scores are normalized into [−1, 1]). Based
on the properties of key-value data, the analyzing tasks will
include two parts: frequency estimation of keys and mean
estimation of values for given key.
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The frequency estimation allows us to know the proportion
of people with given keys. For example, the rate of people
who ordered Hamburger can be given by fk=Hamburger. The
mean estimation allows us to know people’s average appetite
for the food they eat. For example, the average rating of
k = Fries is −0.3+(−0.1)2 = −0.2, while that of k = Pepsi is
0.8+(−0.9)+0.8
3 = 0.83, which might reveal to us that one who
orders Pepsi loves it, but one orders Fries probably because
he just needs something to eat.
The PrivKV and PrivKV-based methods are proposed
to handle the frequency and mean estimation in key-value
data [12]. However, our experiments support that the PrivKV-
related methods only work well with a high average of mean.
Thus in the first part of this paper, we propose a series of
encoding and decoding mechanisms that are ǫ-differentially
private for frequency and mean estimation in key-value data.
All the proposed methods have low communication cost and
compared with PrivKVM, and the proposed methods do not
need to interact with an aggregator frequently.
Our investigation indicates that correlations between at-
tributes are essential in many analyzing and learning tasks.
The On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) data cube is the
exhaustion of possible marginals of data sets. And correlations
are important in decision makings, such as the typical deci-
sion tree [13]. For the key-value data, retrieving conditional
probabilities between keys can provide useful information for
more in-depth analysis. Thus the rest part of this paper focuses
on analyzing correlations of frequencies and means between
different keys. The problem is motivated by such kind of
problems:
Motivating problem: Will those ordered hamburgers order
Pepsi? How to model people’s appetites for Pepsi if they’ve
ordered fries? These questions are important to merchants.
For example, upon knowing that people who love hamburger
also wants to eat fries, a new combo can be introduced
by merchants. Such problems are challenging when privacy
concerns are considered. We call such kind of problems
conditional analysis.
Currently, to the best of our knowledge, no proposed
methods can handle the conditional analysis for key-value
data. Even though the PrivKV-based mechanisms can estimate
frequency and mean for a single key, they do not support any
conditional analysis as each user only randomly sends one key-
value pair to the aggregator. To address these challenges, in the
rest part of this paper, we introduce the conditional analysis
mechanism for frequency and mean estimation. We define the
L-way conditional notion and propose analyzing mechanism
with ǫ-local differential privacy guarantees. To summarize, the
main contributions are listed as follows:
• We propose a new estimator for frequency and mean
under the framework of PrivKV.
• We propose several mechanisms for estimating the num-
ber of key-value data under the framework of LDP. Com-
pared with existing algorithms, the proposed mechanisms
are more effective and stable.
• For the first time, we introduce conditional analysis for
key-value data. We formulate the problem of L-way
conditional analysis in the local setting.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we briefly include previous work. In Section III we propose
a new estimator under the encoding results of PrivKV. In
Section IV, several perturbation mechanisms are presented and
analyzed. In Section V, we define the conditional analysis
problem and proposed methods for it. At last, the experimental
results are shown in Section VI and the whole paper is
concluded in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Local Differential Privacy
The notion of differential privacy was initially proposed for
statistical database, where a trusted data curator is assumed.
The data curator gathers, processes, and publishes data in
a way that satisfies requirements of differential privacy. In
many application scenarios, such a trusted party does not exist,
therefore comes up the local differential privacy.
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy [14]). A randomized
mechanism is ǫ-local differential privacy (ǫ-LDP) iff for any
two tuples x, x′ ∈ X and any output o ∈ O:
Pr[M(x) = o] ≤ eǫ · Pr[M(x′) = o],
where the randomness is over mechanism M.
There are many functional properties of differential privacy,
one of which is the composition [2], usually used to track the
privacy loss in sequential executions.
Lemma 1 (Composition Theorem). Let Mi : N|X | →
Ri be an ǫi-differential privacy algorithm, and M(x) :
N
|X | → ∏ki=1 Ri, where M(x) is defined to be
M(x) = {M1(x), ...,Mk(x)}. ThenM(x) satisfies
∑k
i=1 ǫi-
differential privacy.
The canonical solution towards local differential privacy
is randomized response [15], first introduced in the litera-
ture as a survey design technique. The randomized response
mechanism provides plausible deniability. Thus the aggregator
cannot reveal original data with a high confidence level. The
randomized response works as follows: for a user having a
bit value v ∈ {0, 1}, he flips the value with rate p > 0.5
(which means the sent value is the same as the original
value with probability p). Then the randomized response
achieves LDP with eǫ = p/(1− p). Perturbation mechanisms
with randomized response offer acceptable accuracy under
large datasets. The randomized response plays a core role in
many recent LDP mechanisms. One typical implementation is
Google deployment of RAPPOR [6], the randomized response
is used in each bit of output array by bloom filters. For
continuous data, the randomized response can be used in the
discretized value for mean estimation [16], [10], [17], [18].
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TABLE II
NOTATIONS
Symbol Description
U the set of users, and n = |U|
ui:i∈[n] the i-th user in U
K the set of keys, and d = |K|
Si the set of key-value pair owned by ui
〈ki,j , vi,j〉 the j-th key-value pair in Si
fk the frequency of key k
mk the mean of values with key k
C = (α, β) conditions of keys
The basic randomized response only works for binary
response (|K| = 2). For category data with |K| > 2, a general-
ized randomized response (also called Direct Encoding [19])
is proposed.
Pr[M(x) = v] =
{
p, if v = x,
1−p
|K|−1 , otherwise.
In other words, the true value is reported with probability
p, while each other value is reported with probability 1−p|K|−1 .
To achieve ǫ-LDP, we set p = eǫ/(eǫ + |K| − 1).
B. Key-Value Data Collection
The problem of privacy-preserving key-value data collection
with frequency and mean estimation in the local setting is
first proposed in [12]. Before defining the problem, we first
describe the notations used in this paper.
The key-value data collecting and analyzing framework
under LDP can be briefly stated as follows: let the universe
contain a set of users U = {u1, u2, ..., un} and a set of
keys K = {1, 2, ..., d}. The value domain V for the keys
is in the domain of [−1, 1]. We consider that each user ui
owns a list of (say ℓi, which is at most d) key-value pairs
Si := {〈ki,j , vi,j〉 | 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓi, ki,j ∈ K, vi,j ∈ V}. An
untrusted data collector needs to estimate statistics information
of the key-value data, especially, the frequency estimation and
the mean estimation.
• Frequency estimation: The goal of frequency estimation
is to estimate the frequency of key k. It is the portion of
users who possess the key. It is defined as:
fk =
|{ui|∃〈k, v〉 ∈ Si}|
n
.
• Mean estimation: The goal of mean estimation is to
estimate the mean values of key k. It is defined as:
mk =
∑
i
∑
j:ki,j=k
vi,j
|{ui|∃〈k, v〉 ∈ Si}| .
C. PrivKV
Ye et al. [12] adopt local perturbation protocol and propose
the basic PrivKV algorithm for statistical estimation. They
also extend PrivKV to PrivKVM and PrivKVM+ to improve
estimation accuracy.
If the j-th key ki,j of user i exists, we have ki,j = 1,
otherwise, ki,j = 0. When the key does not exist in ui, it is
represented by 〈k, v〉 = 〈0, 0〉. Thus, given k, the key-value
Algorithm 1 Local Perturbation Protocol (LPP)
Require:
User ui’s set of key-value pairs Si; Privacy budget ǫ1 and
ǫ2.
Ensure:
LPP (Si, ǫ1, ǫ2) is the perturbed key-value pair 〈kj , v∗〉
of the j-th key.
1: Sample j uniformly at random from [d];
2: if kj exists in the key set of Si then
3: V ∗ = V PP (Vj , ǫ2);
4: Perturbs 〈kj , v∗〉 as:
〈kj , v∗〉 =
{ 〈1, v∗〉 with probability eǫ1eǫ1+1 ,
〈0, 0〉 with probability 1eǫ1+1 ;
5: else
6: Randomly draw a value m ∈ [−1, 1];
7: v∗ = V PP (m, ǫ2);
8: Perturbs 〈kj , v∗〉 as:
〈kj , v∗〉 =
{ 〈0, 0〉 with probability eǫ1eǫ1+1 ,
〈1, v∗〉 with probability 1eǫ1+1 ;
9: end if
10: return j and 〈kj , v∗〉;
pair can be represented as 〈k, v〉 ∈ {〈0, 0〉, 〈1, v〉} where v ∈
[−1, 1]. To achieve LDP in key-value protection, the PrivKV-
based mechanisms have four types of perturbations:
• 1 → 1: The key exists before and after perturbation.
Under the circumstances, only the value needs to be
perturbed, i.e., 〈1, v〉 → 〈1, v′〉.
• 1 → 0: The key-value pair disappears after perturbation.
As the key does not exist, the value is meaningless and
is set to zero. For example, 〈1, v〉 → 〈0, 0〉.
• 0→ 1: A new key-value pair is generated after perturba-
tion and a value is assigned, i.e., 〈0, 0〉 → 〈1, v′〉.
• 0→ 0: The key-value pair does not exist before and after
the perturbation. In this case, the key-value pair is kept
unchanged, i.e., 〈0, 0〉 → 〈0, 0〉.
The PrivKV-based mechanisms guarantee ǫ-LDP by provid-
ing indistinguishability for both key and value in key-value
data. The randomized response can be directly used for key
perturbation, as the key space is binary. For value perturbation,
the perturbation mechanism called Harmony [10] is used for
mean estimation (also seen in [20]). Values in continuity
interval [−1, 1] are first discretized to {−1, 1} through Eq. (1),
then the randomized response is used in the discretized value
for perturbation. These two steps are called VPP (Value
Perturbation Primitive).
v∗ =
{
1 with probability 1+v2 ,
−1 with probability 1−v2 .
(1)
By assigning the randomized response to the key and the
value perturbation mechanism to the value, the local pertur-
bation protocol for key-value data is drawn (Algorithm 1).
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Algorithm 2 PrivKV
Require:
Key-value pairs S = S1, S2, ..., Sn; Privacy budgets ǫ1, ǫ2.
Ensure:
Frequency vector f∗ and mean vector m∗.
1: //User-side perturbation{User-side perturbation}
2: Each user perturbs her set and sends the index j and
〈kj , v∗〉 = LPP (Si, ǫ1, ǫ2) to data collector.
3: //Aggregator-side calibration
4: for each key k do
5: Aggregator calculates frequency f∗k ;
6: Aggregator calibrates the frequency as:
f∗k =
p− 1 + f∗k
2p− 1 ,where p =
eǫ1
eǫ1 + 1
;
7: Aggregator counts 1 and -1 in the set of values:
n′1 = Count(1), n
′
2 = Count(−1);
8: Let N = n′1 + n
′
2.
9: Aggregator calibrates the counts as (p = e
ǫ2
eǫ2+1 ):
n∗1 =
p− 1
2p− 1 ·N +
n′1
2p− 1 , n
∗
2 =
p− 1
2p− 1 ·N +
n′2
2p− 1;
10: Clip n∗1 and n
∗
2 to [0, N ];
11: Aggregator calculates mean m∗k =
n∗1−n∗1
N ;
12: end for
13: return f∗ and m∗;
When an untrusted aggregator receives the perturbed key-
value data, he can then estimate the frequency of keys and
mean of values with the PrivKV algorithms (Algorithm 2).
Based on the PrivKV algorithm, the PrivKVM with iterations
and PrivKVM+ with virtual iterations are also proposed. For
simplicity, the algorithms are not detailed. The results are
covered in our experimental analysis.
III. ESTIMATOR FOR PrivKV
The main intuition for the mean estimation under local
differential privacy is to estimate the frequency of k = 1.
This problem has been well studied under current frequency
estimation framework. After discretization, the number of
〈k, v〉 with k = 1 consists of two parts: those with value
−1 and those with value 1. For the mean estimation, the top
priority task is to estimate the number of key-value pair with
value 1 and −1, which is mk = N1−N−1N1+N−1 . The perturbed key-
value data are in the same space as that after discretization
(i.e., all in {〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉}). The aggregator only uses
the counting information of {〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉} according to
the PrivKV algorithm (note that the {〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉} is the
perturbed value). This causes error for the mean estimation
(Line 7-8 in Algorithm 2), as part of 〈0, 0〉 also turns into
{〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉} and some key-value pairs turns into 〈0, 0〉.
It inspires us to develop mean estimation method to elimi-
nate the impact of key perturbation. Instead of directly estimat-
ing mk with received key-value pairs, we design an unbiased
estimator for estimating N0, N1 and N−1.
For the aggregator, let M1 = Count(〈1, 1〉),M−1 =
Count(〈1,−1〉) be the counts of the key-value pairs
〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉 respectively, and M0 = Count(〈0, 0〉) be the
counts of the received key-value pairs without key. Then
the total received records by the data collector is M =
M0 + M1 + M−1. Let p′1 = 2p1 − 1 and p′2 = 2p2 − 1,
according to the encoding process, we can estimate N1 and
N−1 by N∗1 and N
∗
−1:
N∗1 =
(p1p
′
2 + p
′
1)M1 + (p1p
′
2 − p′1)M−1 − p1p′2(1− p1)M
2p1 · p′1 · p′2
,
N∗−1 =
(p1p
′
2 − p′1)M1 + (p1p′2 + p′1)M−1 − p1p′2(1− p1)M
2p1 · p′1 · p′2
.
Theorem 2. The estimators of N∗1 and N
∗
−1 for N1 and N−1
are unbiased, respectively.
Proof. Instead of retrieving E[N∗1 ] = N1 and E[N
∗
−1] = N−1,
we calculate by transforming the above equations. Through
the encoding process of Algorithm 1, we have:

M0 = N0 · p1 + (N1 +N−1) · (1 − p1),
M1 = N0 · 1−p12 +N1 · p1 · p2 +N−1 · p1(1 − p2),
M−1 = N0 · 1−p12 +N1 · p1 · (1− p2) +N−1 · p1 · p2.
From which we get:{
E[N∗1 ] + E[N
∗
−1] =
M1+M−1−M(1−p1)
2p1−1 = N1 +N−1,
E[N∗1 ]− E[N∗−1] = M1−M−1p1(2p2−1) = N1 −N−1.
Then it holds that:{
E[N∗1 ] = N1,
E[N∗−1] = N−1.
which concludes that the N∗1 and N
∗
−1 are unbiased estimator
for N1 and N−1. We can also estimate N0 by N∗0 = M −
N∗1 −N∗−1, which is also unbiased.
IV. LDP FOR KEY-VALUE DATA
In this section, we combine the state-of-art locally differ-
entially private mechanisms for data collecting and propose
several ǫ-LDP perturbation mechanisms for key-value data
collecting and analyzing that can be used in different scenarios.
A. F2M: Frequency to Mean
Unlike PrivKV-based mechanisms, we notice that there is
no need to maintain the authenticity of the sent key-value
pairs. For example, when original key ki does not exist in key-
value pairs, the data should be in form of 〈ki, vi〉 = 〈0, 0〉.
Setting the value vi to any value will make it meaningless.
Thus, in the PirvKV algorithm, the perturbed key-value
results can only be in the form of 〈0, 0〉, 〈1,−1〉 or 〈1, 1〉,
where 〈ki, vi〉 = 〈0, 0〉 represents that the key does not
exists and vi = 0 is useless. Whereas we think more states
in the perturbed space can provide more information when
4
Algorithm 3 F2M: Frequency to Mean
Require:
User ui’s set of key-value pairs Si; Privacy budget ǫ1 and
ǫ2; Default value v when key does not exist.
Ensure:
F2M(Si, ǫ1, ǫ2) is the perturbed key-value pair 〈k′i,j , v′i,j〉
of the j-th key of user i
1: Sample j uniformly at random from [d];
2: Perturb key with:
Pr[k′i,j = ki,j ] =
eǫ1
eǫ1 + 1
;
3: if kj exists in the key set of Si then
4: v′i,j = V PP (vi,j , ǫ2);
5: else
6: v′i,j = V PP (v, ǫ2);
7: end if
8: return j and 〈kj , v∗〉;
estimating. From this point, the state 〈0, 0〉 is substituted by
〈0, 1〉 and 〈0,−1〉.
In the LPP, when an existing key of a key-value data is
perturbed to not exist, the value is directly set to 0, which in-
creases error in mean estimation. The main difference between
Algorithm 3 and Algorithm 1 is that all the outputs of LPP
are in the same space as the original space, meanwhile F2M
of Algorithm 3 is not. In this mechanism, we treat key and
value as irrelevant data and perturb them separately.
Perturbing key and value of a key-value pair independently
allows the aggregator to estimate the frequency and mean of
all key-value pairs. However, the goal of mean estimation in
key-value data is to estimate those values with keys. Hence
the influence of frequency to mean estimation should be
considered. When encoding, we set the value without key to
a default value v. We will further explain how to use this
information for mean estimation. Let:{
M−1 = Count(〈∗,−1〉),
M1 = Count(〈∗, 1〉).
Then we can estimate the mean of all the values (with and
without key) by:
m∗all =
eǫ + 1
eǫ − 1 ·
M1 −M−1
M1 +M−1
.
With m∗all and f
∗, we can then estimate m∗k by:
m∗k =
m∗all − (1− f∗k ) · v
f∗k
. (2)
In the F2M mechanism of Algorithm 3, we perturb key and
value separately. From the composition theorem (Lemma 1),
F2M achieves ǫ-local differential privacy. Also, we can be sure
with probability at least (1 − δ)2 that (in Appendix A):
|m∗k −mk| ≤
2(fk + 1)(e
ǫ + 1)
√
ln (2/δ)√
2Nf2k (e
ǫ − 1)− f(eǫ − 1)
√
ln (2/δ)
.
Algorithm 4 KVUE: Unary Encoding for Key-Value Data
Require:
User ui’s set of KV pairs Si; Privacy budget ǫ.
Ensure:
KV UE(Si, ǫ) is the perturbed KV pair 〈kj , v∗〉 of the
j-th key
1: Sample j uniformly at random from [d].
2: if kj exists then
3: Discretization v to v∗.
4: end if
5: Report 〈k′, v′〉 ∈ {〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉} with Eq. (3).
6: return j and 〈k′, v′〉;
B. Unary Encoding for Key-Value data
The F2M perturbation mechanism aims at eliminating the
restriction that the value can only be 0 when the key of a key-
value pair does not exist. Thinking that the original key-value
data can only be in three statures when discretized, we pool
the principle of the generalized randomized response to design
a mapping function between the original and perturbed space.
For 〈k′, v′〉 ∈ {〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉}, the mapping between
perturbed key-value data and the original data is designed by:
Pr[〈k′, v′〉] = e
ǫ − 1
eǫ + 2
· [(k′ ⊙ k) ∧ (v′ ⊙ v∗)] + 1
eǫ + 2
. (3)
where v∗ = Discretiaztion(v) represents the discretization
process shown in Eq. (1), and (k′⊙ k)∧ (v′⊙ v∗) equals 1 if
〈k′, v′〉 = 〈k, v∗〉 and 0 otherwise. We name this perturbation
mechanism KVUE (Key-Value Unary Encoding). The prob-
ability mapping function is somehow difficult to understand.
If we treat each key-value pair as a whole entity instead of
treating key and value separately, we can directly use the
generalized randomized response. Intuitively inspired by this,
the mapping is equal to:
Pr[〈k′, v′〉 = 〈k, v∗〉] = e
ǫ
eǫ + 2
Theorem 3. The unary encoding mechanism for key-value
pair achieves ǫ-LDP.
Proof. According to Eq. (3), for any key-value pairs 〈k, v〉 ∈
{〈0, 0〉, 〈1, v〉} and the possible output 〈k′, v′〉, we have:
1
eǫ + 2
≤ Pr[〈k′, v′〉|〈k, v〉] ≤ e
ǫ
eǫ + 2
.
Thus, for any input 〈k1, v1〉, 〈k2, v2〉 and output 〈ko, vo〉, we
obtain Pr[〈ko, vo〉|〈k1, v1〉] ≤ eǫ×Pr[〈ko, vo〉|〈k2, v2〉], which
ensures ǫ-LDP for KV UE.
Same as the analysing in F2M, let M0,M1,M−1 be the
number of 〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉 received by the aggregator.
For i ∈ {0, 1,−1}, denote (let p = eǫeǫ+2 ):
N∗i =
2Mi − (1− p)M
3p− 1 . (4)
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Then we can say that N∗i is an unbiased estimator. The
proof is given in Theorem 4.
Theorem 4. ∀i ∈ {0, 1,−1}, N∗i is an unbiased estimator.
Proof. According to the algorithm, for i, j ∈ {0, 1,−1}, we
have:
Mi = pNi +
∑
j 6=i
1− p
2
Nj .
We then achieve:
E[N∗i ] =
2E[Mi]− (1− p)M
3p− 1
=
2Nip+ (1− p)
∑
j 6=iNj − (1− p)M
3p− 1
= Ni.
which concludes the correctness of theorem.
The unary encoding first maps a key-value pair into a single
item and then uses the generalized randomized response to
achieve ǫ-LDP. Thus the variance is the same as the that of
Direct Encoding (DE [19]):
V ar(Ni) =
N · (eǫ + 1)
(eǫ − 1)2 . (5)
Theorem 5. Given δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ,
we have:
|N∗i −Ni| ≤
eǫ + 2
eǫ − 1
√
N
2
· ln 2
δ
.
Proof. Based on the Chernoff–Hoeffding bound [21], for every
t > 0, it holds that:
Pr
[|M∗i −Mi| ≥ t] ≤ 2e− 2t2N .
Then, we have:
Pr
[|N∗i −Ni| ≥ 2t3p− 1 ] ≤ 2e− 2t2N .
Let r = 2t3p−1 , which corresponds to t = r(3p − 1)/2, we
achieve:
Pr[|N∗i −Ni| ≥ r] ≤ 2e−
r2(3p−1)2
2N .
Let δ = 2e−
r2(3p−1)2
2N , corresponding to r =
1
3p−1
√
2N · ln 2δ , then we can say that with probability at least
1− δ, we have:
|N∗i −Ni| ≤
eǫ + 2
eǫ − 1
√
N
2
· ln 2
δ
. (6)
Thus, this completes the proofs.
With the unbiased estimator for N0, N1 and N−1, we can
then estimate the frequency and mean easily.
Algorithm 5 KVOH: One Hot encoding for Key-Value data
Require:
A user u’s set of key-value pairs S; Privacy budget ǫ.
Ensure:
KVOH(S, ǫ) is the perturbed KV pair.
1: Sample j uniformly at random from [d].
2: if kj exists then
3: Discretization v to v∗.
4: end if
5: Initialize a empty array: A = [0, 0, 0].
6: Indexing: A[k · v∗ + 1] = 1.
7: Report each bit in A with probability defined in Eq. (7).
8: return A;
C. One-Hot Encoding for Key-Value Data
The one-hot encoding mechanism was commonly used in
histogram estimation [22], [6]. For bucket i, the one hot
encoding returns a vector in which all bits are 0 except the i-th
index. The encoding mechanism inspires us to uses such a bit
array for state representation of key-value data. As analyzed
in preceding sections, there are three statuses when one key-
value pair is discretized. We design the following mechanism
for index projection:
I(〈k, v〉) = k · Discretization(v) + 1.
Thus the one-hot encoding for a key-value pair can be
represented by A[I(k, v)] = 1. Then we use randomized
response in each bit of A by:
Pr
[A[i] = 1] = eǫ/2 − 1
eǫ/2 + 1
· A[i] + 1
eǫ/2 + 1
. (7)
The randomized response guarantees ǫ/2-LDP for every
single bit. Since A and A′ differ only in two bits, so we achieve
ǫ-LDP for A according to the composition theorem. We call
this KVOH (Key-Value One-Hot mechanism).
Same as the proposed methods, we focus on estimating the
number of each state after discretization instead of directly
estimating frequency and mean, which is to retrieve the
number of states in A. LetMi =
∑Ai be the sum of received
arrays and N denotes the number of arrays. We first adjust the
sum of arrays before perturbation by:
N∗i =
(eǫ/2 + 1) ·Mi −N
eǫ/2 − 1 .
It is easy to prove that the estimator of Ni is unbiased [19],
and the variance is:
V ar(Ni) =
N · eǫ/2
(eǫ/2 − 1)2 .
Similar to the proof of Theorem 5, we can obtain
Pr[|N∗i −Ni| ≥ t ·
eǫ/2 − 1
eǫ/2 + 1
] ≤ 2e− 2t
2
N .
By setting r = t · eǫ/2−1
eǫ/2+1
, we then have:
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Pr
[|N∗i −Ni| ≥ r] ≤ 2e− 2r2N ·( eǫ/2−1eǫ/2+1 )2 .
By using δ = 2e
− 2r2N ·( e
ǫ/2
−1
eǫ/2+1
)2
, we can say that with
probability at least 1− δ, we have:
|N∗i −Ni| ≤
eǫ/2 + 1
eǫ/2 − 1 ·
√
N
2
· ln 2
δ
.
D. Estimation Analysis
In the designation of KVOH and KVUE encoding mecha-
nisms, we propose unbiased estimator for the states of 〈0, 0〉,
〈1,−1〉, 〈1, 1〉 (denoted as N0, NA and NB) and use the
number of states for further estimation instead of directly
estimating the frequency and mean:
f∗k =
N∗A +N
∗
B
N
, and m∗k =
N∗A −N∗B
N∗A +N
∗
B
.
In this section, we give the upper bound for the estimator
of f∗ and m∗. To analyze the estimation error, we first define
θA = N
∗
A − NA and θB = N∗B − NB as the estimation
error of the state number for different states. For the frequency
estimation, we then can analyze the estimating error by:
err(fk) =
∣∣∣∣N∗A +N∗BN − NA +NBN
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣θA + θBN
∣∣∣∣ .
For mean estimation, we have:
err(mk) =
∣
∣
∣
∣
N∗A −N
∗
B
N∗A +N
∗
B
−
NA −NB
NA +NB
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
NA −NB + θA − θB
NA +NB + θA + θB
−
NA −NB
NA +NB
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
(θA − θB)(NA +NB)− (θA + θB)(NA −NB)
(NA +NB)(NA +NB + θA + θB)
∣
∣
∣
∣
=
∣
∣
∣
∣
(θA − θB)− (θA + θB) ·mk
fk ·N + θA + θB
∣
∣
∣
∣
.
In the prior sections, we’ve proven that with probability at
least 1 − δ, we have Pr[|N∗i − Ni| ≤ r]. Considering the
noises on NA and NB are independent, the error of frequency
estimation can be sure with:
Pr[err(fk) ≤ 2r
N
] ≥ (1− δ)2.
For the mean estimation, we then have:
err(mk) =
∣∣∣∣ (θA − θB)− (θA + θB) ·mkfk ·N + θA + θB
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣θA(1−mk)− θB(1 +mk)fk ·N − 2r
∣∣∣∣
≤ |θA|(1 −mk) + |θB|(1 +mk)
fk ·N − 2r
≤ 1
fk ·N/(2r)− 1 .
Hence, we can guarantee that by at least (1− δ)2 probability,


|fk − f∗k |KVUE ≤ e
ǫ+2
eǫ−1
√
2
N · ln 2δ ,
|mk −m∗k|KVUE ≤
(eǫ+2)·
√
2 ln (2/δ)
(eǫ−1)fk·
√
N−(eǫ+2)·
√
2 ln (2/δ)
,
and that by at least (1− δ)2 probability,

|fk − f∗k |KVOH ≤ e
ǫ/2+1
eǫ/2−1
√
2
N · ln 2δ ,
|mk −m∗k|KVOH ≤
(eǫ/2+1)·
√
2 ln (2/δ)
fk(eǫ/2−1)·
√
N−(eǫ/2+1)·
√
2 ln (2/δ)
.
V. CONDITIONAL FREQUENCY AND MEAN ESTIMATION
In this section, we present a complete analysis for privacy-
preserving key-value data, which allows conditional analysis.
Before giving the solutions, we first formulate the L-way
conditional frequency and mean. To better understand the L-
way conditional problems, we start from an example. For
simplicity, we take d = 3 and k ∈ {Hamburger, Fries, Pepsi}
as a subset of Table I. After discretization, each user’s key-
value data is listed as follows:
TABLE III
CONDITIONAL TABLE EXAMPLE
User 〈kHamburger, v〉 〈kFries, v〉 〈kPepsi, vc〉
User1 〈1, 1〉 〈0, 0〉 〈1,−1〉
User2 〈1,−1〉 〈1, 1〉 〈1, 1〉
User3 〈0, 0〉 〈1,−1〉 〈1,−1〉
Definition 2 (L-way Conditional Frequency and Mean).
Given target key k and L conditional keys, the conditional
frequency and conditional mean of key k is defined as
fk|ck1=c1,...,ckL−1=cL−1 and mk|ck1=c1,...,ckL−1=cL−1 , where
cki ∈ k[d] represents a key and ci ∈ {0, 1} represents the
key cki exists or not.
Given conditions C : ck1, ck2, ..., ckL−1 = c1, c2, ..., cL−1,
we say that a user meets conditions if the existence of key cki
is ci. For example, kFries, kPepsi = 0, 1 represents a consumer
ordered Pepsi but not Fries (which is user1 in this example).
With those L − 1 conditions, we now formulate the L-way
conditional frequency and means:
fk|ck1,...,ckL−1=c1,...,cL−1 =
|{ui|ui ∈ UC , ∃〈k, v〉 ∈ Si}|
|UC | ,
mk|ck1,...,ckL−1=c1,...,cL−1 =
∑
ui:ui∈UC,〈k,v〉∈Si v
|{ui|ui ∈ UC , ∃〈k, v〉 ∈ Si}| .
Where UC means users with conditions C. For example, to
represent consumer’s average scores of Hamburgers among
those who orders Pepsi, we can use the 2-way conditional
mean mkHamburger=1|kPepsi=1. The L-way conditional notions are
easy to understand but not manageable. Considering that keys
in conditions might be out-of-order, we introduce the (α, β)-
condition to formalize the L-way conditions to a length-d bit
vector:
Definition 3 ( α, β-condition). Given conditions C =
{ck1, ck2, ckL = c1, c2, ..., cL}, α is used to represent what
key is in condition, which is αi|ki=ckj = 1. And β is used to
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Algorithm 6 IOH : Indexing One Hot encoding
Require:
A user u’s set of key-value pairs S =
{〈k1, v1〉, ..., 〈kd, vd〉} (here 〈kj , vj〉 is set to 〈0, 0〉
if user u does not have it); Privacy budget ǫ.
Ensure:
IOH(S, ǫ) is the perturbed key-value pair.
1: Discretize each key-value data to k′i, v
′
i;
2: Indexing each encoded key-value pair by k′i · v′i + 1 and
get the overall index by:
I = (k′1 · v′1 + 1)|(k′1 · v′1 + 1)|...|(k′d · v′d + 1); (8)
3: Initialize a array: A = [0, 0, ..., 0], where |A| = 3d;
4: Indexing: A[I] = 1;
5: Perturb each bit in A with probability ǫ/2;
6: return A;
represent the value of key, which is βi = cj if there exists j
s.t. ckj = ki.
For example, the conditions C = {kHamburger = 1, kFries = 0}
can be represented by C = (α = 110, β = 100). α = 110
indicates that the first key and the second key is assigned in
conditions, the conditional value of the key is in β, which is
β = 100). In the rest of this paper, we use C = (α, β) for
conditions representation.
To handle the conditional estimation with privacy concerns,
we first need to encode all of the key-value data. The proposed
methods for frequency and mean estimation only works on
one single key-value pair. To achieve ǫ-LDP on the whole
key-value pairs, each key-value pair should be encoded with
ǫ′ = ǫ/d, which might cause errors in the estimation results. To
overcome this, we introduce the Indexing One Hot encoding
(IOH) mechanism. Following KVOH, a key-value pair 〈ki, vi〉
is first encoded to a single state by:
I(〈ki, vi〉) = ki · Discretization(vi) + 1.
Then we can get the index by all the I(〈ki, vi〉):
I =
d∑
i=1
3d−i · I(〈ki, vi〉).
We initialize a zero array A and set A[I] = 1. The bit array
is the one hot encoding of key-value pairs, like KVOH, we
can achieve ǫ-LDP by using ǫ′ = ǫ/2 on each bit. To sum
up, the process is in Algorithm 6. Unlike KV OH , the IOH
encoding mechanism encodes all of key-value of a user. For
user1 in our example, the key-value pairs are first indexed with
the indexing function:
〈1, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉, 〈1,−1〉 → 210(3).
The subscript (3) here means the base of 210 is 3. Thus
user1 encodes his data to a bit array with its index 12 set to
1. When all the data are transferred to the aggregator, all the
received bit vectors are adjusted and summed up to a As:
As[i] =
(eǫ/2 + 1) ·∑j Aj [i]−N
eǫ/2 − 1 . (9)
Here, Aj denotes the j-th user’s indexing one hot encoding
vector. We will further extract the conditional frequency and
conditional means from the summed array As[i]. We will fur-
ther use the adjusted As for conditional frequency estimation
and conditional mean estimation.
A. Conditional Frequency Estimation
To retrieve information from the summed array As, we first
define the frequency counting operator.
Definition 4 (Frequency Counting Operator). Given vectorAs,
the frequency counting operator Fαβ [As] : R3
d → R(α, β ∈
{0, 1}d) counts the number of users with conditions α, β.
For example, if we want to know the number of users with
ka, kc = 1, 0 in Table III. We first get the (α, β) = (101, 100).
We want to know fka|kc=1, thus we need to know the number
of users with ka, kc = 1, 1 and the number of users with
kc = 1.
F101101 [As] = F111101 + F111111 .
Another example is that fkc=0 can be represented by:
F001000 = F011000 + F011010
= F111000 + F111100 + F111010 + F111110 .
To make it simple, when the superscript is all 1, we ignore
it (Fγ is short for F11...11γ in the following equation). With
the defined F , we can calculate Fαβ by:
Fαβ [As] =
∑
γ:γ∧α=β
Fγ [As]. (10)
The frequency counting operator can be used for the con-
ditional frequency estimation. For example, the conditional
frequency fka|kc=1 can be represented by:
fk1|k3=1 =
F101101 [As]
F001001 [As]
.
When encoding, all of the user’s data are mapped into
a length 3d bit vector. For frequency estimation, we need
to extract given key-value data under condition C. We now
introduce the notion of condition to frequency index for
computing F .
Definition 5 (Condition to Frequency Index). For conditional
vector γ ∈ {0, 1}d, the corresponding index of F is given by
I(γ) = I(γ0)|I(γ1)|...|I(γd−1), where I(γi) is defined as:
I(γi) =
{
{0, 2}, If γi = 1,
{1}, If γi = 0.
For example, to compute F101, the index set is:
I(101) = I(1)|I(0)|I(1)
= {010, 012, 210, 212}.
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With the index of I(γ), we can compute Fγ by:
Fγ [As] =
∑
i∈I(γ)
As[i]. (11)
Following this example, the frequency under condition C =
(α, β) can be given by:
fk|C=(α,β) = Fα∨α[k]=1β∨β[k]=1 /Fαβ . (12)
B. Conditional Mean Estimation
Like the frequency counting operator, we define two count-
ing operations to handle the conditional mean estimation tasks.
We use Sk|αβ to represent the sum of value with key k under
condition α, β, Then the conditional mean can be given by:
mk|C=(α,β) =
Sk|C∨{k=1}
Fα∨α[k]=1β∨β[k]=1
. (13)
The notion α ∨ α[k] = 1 and α ∨ α[k] = 1 indicates that
when considering mk|C=(α,β), the key k should be included.
The main problem now is to calculate Sk|C . Like Fαβ , we use
Sk,γ to represent (Sk)11...11γ . For the k-th key-value pair, the
value can be 1 and −1. The mean estimation then turns to be
the counting problem: to count the number of key-value pairs
with the k-th value be 1 and be -1. The symbol Sk,γ calculates
the sum of values with key k. After discretization, the sum of
Sk,γ [As] can be divided into two parts: those with the k−th
key-value pair being 〈1, 1〉 (denoted as S+k,γ [As]) and those
being 〈1,−1〉 (denoted as S−k,γ [As]).
Sk|C = S+k|C [As]− S−k|C [As]
=
∑
γ:γ∧α=β
S+k,γ [As]−
∑
γ:γ∧α=β
S−k,γ [As]. (14)
Like the frequency index operator, we now define the mean
index operator to extract S+k,γ and S−k,γ from As.
Definition 6 (condition to mean index). For conditional vector
γ ∈ {0, 1}d, the corresponding index of S+k,γ [As] (and
S−k,γ [As]) can be represented by:
S+k,γ [As] = I(γ0)|...|I(γk−1)| I+(γk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value 1
|I(γk+1)|...|I(γd−1),
S−k,γ [As] = I(γ0)|...|I(γk−1)| I−(γk)︸ ︷︷ ︸
value -1
|I(γk+1)|...|I(γd−1),
where the I+(γ) and I−(γ) are defined as:
I+(γ) =
{
{2}, If γ = 1,
{1}, If γ = 0,
I−(γ) =
{
{0}, If γ = 1,
{1}, If γ = 0.
The only difference between conditional frequency and
conditional mean is that for key k, the frequency estimation
needs the overall number of value 1 and value −1. Whereas
for mean estimation, we need to estimate those with value 1
and those with value −1 separately.
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Fig. 1. Overall results of estimation varying ǫ.
VI. ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance of
proposed mechanisms. The PrivKV-based mechanisms [12]
have shown great advantages in frequency estimation over pro-
posed mechanisms like RAPPOR [6], k-RR [23] and SHist [24].
That is the same in mean estimation, over Harmony [10]
and MeanEst [16]. Thus we only compare our proposed
mechanisms with PrivKV-based mechanisms, namely PrivKV
and PrivKVM.
Datasets used. We evaluate the proposed methods over
a real-world dataset and synthetic datasets. We first use the
MovieLens dataset [25]. This dataset samples were collected
by the GroupLens Research Project. It contains over 20M
ratings from 138,000 users on over 27,000 movies. Each user
has rated at least 20 movies. For each anonymous person,
ratings are treated as key-value data. We first exact the top-100
most rated movies as our key space K and extract s smaller
dataset. We also generated two synthetic datasets: the Uniform
dataset and the Gaussian dataset. The frequency and mean for
different keys follow the uniform distribution and Gaussian
distribution. Each generated dataset has 100 keys and 100,000
records.
Default parameters and settings. In the frequency and
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mean estimation experiment, we acquire the distributions of
estimation error by repeatedly encoding and decoding 50 times
in each experimental instance. Each user randomly picks up
one key-value pair and encodes with different mechanisms.
Then the aggregator decodes with the corresponding mecha-
nism. When encoding, the privacy budget varies from 0.1 to 5.
For the PrivKVM, we set the iterations to be 10. The result is
measured with AE (Absolute Error) and MSE (Mean Square
Error). For the F2M estimator, we set the default v = 1. Also,
the influence of the default value is discussed in Section VI-C.
A. Overall Results
We first list the theoretical communicating cost between a
user end to the aggregator end. The cost is based on the number
of state of the encoded key-value data. For example, the
encoded space of PrivKV is 〈k′, v′〉 ∈ {〈0, 0〉, 〈1, 1〉, 〈1,−1〉},
thus the communicating cost for key-value encoded by PrivKV
can be compressed to log2 3. The PrivKVM works in an
iterative way. Thus the communication cost is c times that of
PrivKV, where c is the number of iterations. When encoding,
a user needs to pick up one key from the key space K. Thus
an index should also be sent to the aggregator. The cost for
index is log2 |K|. The costs of different mechanisms are listed
in Table IV.
TABLE IV
COMMUNICATION COST FOR ONE KEY-VALUE DATA
Methods PrivKV F2M KVUE KVOH
Cost log2(3|K|) 2 · log2 |K| log2(3|K|) 3 · log2 |K|
Figure 1 plots the estimation errors of different mechanisms
with different privacy budgets. Among all these six mecha-
nisms, the PrivKVM is the only one that outputs an unbiased
mean estimation. However, our simulations indicate the ef-
fectiveness of both frequency and mean estimation. As the
PrivKVM achieves unbiased estimation by iterating with the
aggregator, and in each round, the privacy budget is very small
(ǫ′ = ǫ/c). Thus estimation error in each round accumulates.
When the privacy budget is not very small (ǫ > 0.4), the
KVOH, KVUE, KVOH, PrivKV and PrivKV-A can achieve
estimation error under 0.05. Over the tested mechanisms,
KV UE achieves lower estimation error considering different
privacy-preserving levels on both generated dataset and real-
world dataset.
All of these mechanisms have higher mean estimation errors
compared with frequency estimation. We think it is because
of the natural insufficiency of local differential privacy: the
estimation accuracy is influenced by the volume of data. When
estimating the frequency, we need to estimate the number of
key-value data with key from N users, which is N · fk from
N . Compared with that, the mean estimation task requires
estimating the number of key-value pair with value 1 and
value −1 from the estimated key-value data with key. Thus
the accuracy of key estimation affects the performance of
mean estimation. Like frequency estimation, generally, KVUE
achieves lowest estimating error.
B. Scalability
In this section, we evaluate the performance of estimating
mechanisms on different circumstances. For the frequency
estimation, We divide the frequency into four situations: ex-
treme low frequency with fk = 0.05, low frequency with
fk = 0.2, middle frequency with fk = 0.6 and high frequency
fk = 0.8. For the mean estimation, we divide the mean into
three situations: low average with mk around −0.8, middle
average with mk around 0 and high average with mk around
0.8. We generate several these kinds of dataset with Gaussian
distribution and uniform distribution. Each generated dataset
contains 100,000 key-value pairs.
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the box-plot of frequency esti-
mation and mean estimation results with Gaussian distribution.
It turns out that estimation errors of different mechanisms
are not under the influence of frequencies. However, PrivKV,
PrivKVM and PrivKV-A are susceptible to the location of
means. These three mechanisms achieve higher estimation
accuracy with the rise of mean. In both cases, PrivKVM returns
an inaccurate result with large variance. As we analyzed
formally, the error of estimation might accumulate when iterat-
ing. Compared with other mechanisms, the KVUE mechanism
achieves the lowest error in both frequency estimation and
mean estimation. Also, F2M and KVOH mechanisms attain
acceptable results compared with existing methods. Also, with
the increase of frequency, the variance of error decreases. This
is because, with more usable data, the estimation becomes
settled.
When estimating with uniform distributed data, the result
is shown in Figure 4. As in the case of Gaussian distribution,
the result of frequency is not profoundly affected by situations
of frequency. Like aforementioned, we can draw that a higher
frequency leads to a lower mean estimation error.
C. Influence of default value in F2M
In the F2M mechanism, we set the default value of encoding
to v = 1. We think that by setting the default value to 1, the
discretized value is always the same as 1. That avoids addi-
tional errors for further estimation. Thus, a natural question
occurs. Will the value of v influence the performance of mean
estimation? Here, we do not need to discuss the impact of the
default value to frequency estimation as setting default only
affects the process of mean estimation.
Figure 5 compares F2M mechanisms with respect to dif-
ferent default values of v. We observe that the performance
of F2M mechanism does not fluctuate when v changes, which
reflects that the noise introduced by discretization is negligible
compared to that by the randomized response.
D. Conditional analysis
For the efficiency consideration, we only test the 2-way
conditional analysis over d ∈ {2, 4, 8} (with 20 observations
under each configuration). We use datasets with fk = 0.8 in
the low average case with 105 and 106 users. Figure 6 and
7 compare privately and non-privately computed conditional
result of frequency and mean. We first figure out that the
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Fig. 2. Frequency estimation error of different mechanisms on Gaussian distribution data, with respect to the combinations of extreme low frequency, low
frequency, average frequency, high frequency, and low average, middle average, high average.
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Fig. 3. Mean estimation error of different mechanisms on Gaussian distribution data, with respect to the combinations of extreme low frequency, low frequency,
average frequency, high frequency, and low average, middle average, high average.
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Fig. 4. Estimation error on uniform distribution.
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Fig. 5. F2M under different default values.
error of conditional mean estimation is lower to that of
conditional mean estimation. We think this is because the
error of frequency is involved in the mean estimation, as we
analyzed in 1-Way frequency and mean estimation. We also
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.81 2 4 5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
sti
m
at
io
n 
Er
ro
r  d=2
 d=4
 d=8
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.81 2 4 5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
A
ve
ra
ge
 E
sti
m
at
io
n 
Er
ro
r  d=2
 d=4
 d=8
(a) N=105 (b) N=106
Fig. 6. 2-way conditional frequency estimation
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Fig. 7. 2-way conditional mean estimation
observe that with the increase of dimensions, the estimating
error increases, because the encoded space becomes huge
(O(d3)). Thus, the conditional analysis has limitations on high-
11
dimensional data currently.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we propose a series of locally differentially
private mechanisms for frequency and mean estimation of
key-value data. Based on the previous work of PrivKV, we
first propose a decoding mechanism for the data aggregator.
Moreover, we combine several state-of-art LDP methods to
improve the performance of frequency and mean estimation
in the local settings. Theoretical analysis and empirical ex-
periments validate the effectiveness and robustness of our
proposed mechanisms. Beyond that, we introduce the notion
of conditional analysis in key-value data analysis that allows
the aggregator to learn the correlation between keys and
corresponding values.
The first part of work in the to-do list is to achieve an
unbiased estimator for the mean. In this paper, we achieve low
estimation error by unbiased estimation of the number of differ-
ent key-value states after discretization. This leads to biased
mean estimation. We will further show that we can achieve
an unbiased estimator with the use of iteration. Besides that,
to support conditional analysis in key-value data, we encode
all of a user’s data with one hot encoding mechanism. This
takes cost in both communication and computation. Graham et
al. [26] use the Hadamard transform as evaluating a Hadamard
entry is practically faster [27]. As our next move, we intend
to improve the efficiency by the Hadamard transformation and
improve accuracy by using an optimal encoding that achieves
lower variance in the conditional analysis of key-value data.
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APPENDIX
A. Error bound for F2M
For the randomized response, assume there are x records
with value 1 of N records. For the aggregator, after receiving
N records with X records being 1, the estimated x∗ can be
adjusted by:
x∗ = X · e
ǫ + 1
eǫ − 1 −
N
eǫ − 1 . (15)
And we have E[x∗] = x. According to the Chernoff–
Hoeffding bound to independent {0, 1} random variables, for
all t > 0, we have Pr[|X∗ −X | ≥ t] ≤ 2e− 2t2N .
Setting r = t · eǫ+1eǫ−1 and δ = 2 · e−
2r2
N ·( e
ǫ
−1
eǫ+1 )
2
, we obtain
Pr[|x− x∗| ≥ r] ≤ δ.
12
For the frequency, we have x = N · fk. And for the
estimation of mall, we have x = N · mall+12 . Thus the error
of f is bounded by r/N and the error of mall is bounded
by 2r/N . Then for the mean estimation, considering N is big
enough:
|m∗k −mk| =
∣∣∣∣m∗all − (1− f∗k ) · vf∗k −
mall − (1− fk) · v
fk
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣f(m∗ −m) + (fk − f∗k )(m− v)f · f∗k
∣∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣∣ 2r/Nfk − r/N + r/Nfk(fk − r/N) (m− v)
∣∣∣∣
=
2rfk + r(m − v)
fk(Nfk − r) ≤
2r(fk + 1)
fk(Nfk − r) .
Thus, with probability at least (1− δ)2, we can assure:
|m∗k −mk| ≤
2(fk + 1)(e
ǫ + 1)
√
ln (2/δ)√
2Nf2k (e
ǫ − 1)− fk(eǫ − 1)
√
ln (2/δ)
.
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